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ABSTRACT

FACTORS THAT PUSH BANGLADESHI MEDIA TO EXERCISE SELF-CENSORSHIP

by
Abu Taib Ahmed

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2020
Under the Supervision of Professor David S. Allen

Self-censorship is one of the biggest threats to press freedom. Press freedom, as well as
freedom of the expression, is an indicator of a society’s freedom and democracy. If the media
cannot act freely, it can impact society’s ability to function as a democracy. Journalists often face
pressures from various power structures to engage in self-censorship. While journalistic selfcensorship has been examined in a number of different countries, no studies of journalistic selfcensorship in Bangladesh have been undertaken or no studies have been undertaken to see what
factors influence journalists to exercise self-censorship or to figure out reasons that make
journalists in Bangladesh filter media content. Bangladesh’s unique history with journalism and
expressive freedom makes Bangladesh an interesting site for the examination of journalistic selfcensorship. Relying on an analysis of statements, writings and interviews of 38 journalists, the
study revealed six factors that force journalists in Bangladesh to exercise self-censorship. The
factors are: legal barriers, governmental interference, ownership, advertising, partisanship as
unprofessional activity, and religion. This study found that the comments from journalists and
media experts most frequently identify legal barriers, government interference, and partisanship
as unprofessional activity as the greatest influences on self-censorship. Those institutional forces
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punish journalists who violate legal standards or do not reinforce the beliefs of the government
or political party. Journalists who do reinforce those beliefs are rewarded with access to
information, governmental positions, opportunities to travel and other rewards not commonly
available to all people in Bangladesh.
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Chapter I
Introduction

Self-censorship is one of the biggest threats to press freedom. Press freedom, as well as
freedom of the expression, is an indicator of a society’s freedom and democracy. If the media
cannot act freely, it can impact society’s ability to function as a democracy. Journalists often face
pressures from various power structures to engage in self-censorship. In this thesis, I examine the
role self-censorship plays in the creation of Bangladeshi journalistic content. As Bangladeshi
media outlets do not have any legal or professional accountability mechanism (as it goes against
the spirit of freedom of expression and press freedom), self-accountability becomes a key
element in the production of journalistic content. And often, along with self-accountability
comes self-censorship. And while self-accountability is often viewed as being a good for which
to strive, self-censorship is often viewed as being something to be avoided—something that
limits journalistic freedom. This thesis examines how self-censorship by Bangladeshi journalists
can limit the expression of ideas. It also can be employed as a technique that allows journalists to
continue to do their work.
Since its inception in 1971, Bangladesh has had a unique confrontational political system.
Its society is sharply polarized over what should be the nationalistic identity of the country. The
country’s two major political camps – one led by Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and the
other by its arch-enemy Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – pursue politics based on two
different nationalisms, Bengali nationalism and Bangladeshi nationalism respectively, resulting
in a never-ending political confrontation in Bangladesh. Political scientists opine the Bangladeshi
society/polity has been polarized and divided almost vertically on the question of national
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identity and political philosophy and that debate has resulted in sustained political instability and
uncertainty in the country (Hossain, 2015). When Bangladesh’s longstanding political crisis is
rooted in the clash of nationalisms (Maniruzzman, 2016), it is not surprising that journalism
reflects that polarization. Having a long career as a political reporter in Bangladesh, I have seen
how much the media outlets are polarized on the question of politics. Most of them are either
aligned with any of the two political camps or controlled by politically influential individuals
(Home Office, UK, 2017, p. 9 & 20; Rahman, 2012, p.85). I have seen how news reports were
slanted to suit the owner or political masters, why critical questions were not asked, and how
sensitive yet urgent topics were avoided. I have also seen how individual reporters worked like
political activists. This is reflected in the types of questions journalists address to policymakers
and political leadership, but also in how political leadership favor certain reporters and certain
media to give their delicate information.
Observing this interplay between journalists and political leadership is really the
foundation of this thesis. I strive to better understand this relationship by examining how sociopolitical factors push Bangladeshi media and journalists to exercise self-censorship. Drawing on
published writings, videos, and interviews with 38 journalists, this study is an attempt to better
understand the interplays between journalists and the socio-political forces that help shape
journalistic content.
The study found that six factors are incredibly important in the context of Bangladeshi
journalism. Bangladeshi journalists and media experts said that the country’s legal structure,
influence from the government or the ruling power structure, influence stemming from media
ownership, influence from advertisements, individual journalist’s ideology or socio-political
view and religion influence journalistic self-censorship. The most important factors, and the most
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commonly discussed by journalists and media experts in the articles and interviews, were legal
structures, governmental influence, and political partisanship of journalists as unprofessional
activity. Although religion is rarely acknowledged by journalists, this study suggests that it might
have a wider impact on the country’s politics and thus on journalism as religion and religious
affairs are deeply rooted in Bangladesh’s politics and society. All of the six factors that push
journalists and Bangladeshi media to self-censor are well-linked with the country’s politics. It
appears that journalism and politics are nothing but the two sides of the same coin. In other
words, the country’s politics play an instrumental role in shaping the media content in
Bangladesh.
Chapter Descriptions
This project consists of five chapters. The first chapter features a brief introduction into
my interest in the topic followed by the chapter descriptions.
Chapter two includes a description of what is self-censorship. While there is a strong
debate over the very concept and the definition of self-censorship among the scholars, there are
arguments both in favor of self-censorship and against it. Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes
argue that self-censorship is a natural duty of a responsible citizen and an essential condition of
civil peace while other philosophers and scholars believe that self-censorship violates the
freedom of expression and norms of free speech. However, scholars categorize several types of
self-censorship like public self-censorship, private self-censorship, private self-censorship by
proxy, private self-censorship by self-restraint, true self-censorship and justified self-censorship.
The chapter also talks about how self-censorship affects journalism. Scholars argue that
journalistic self-censorship is a “subtle, hidden, and insidious” phenomenon (Lee, 1998, p. 57).
To examine journalistic self-censorship, the chapter reviews Shoemaker and Reese’s Hierarchy
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of Influence Model, Bar-Tal’s (2017) seven elements and aspects of self-censorship that
characterize media self-censorship, and Daniel C Hallin’s (1987) three concentric spheres of
journalism’s world of political discourse: 1) sphere of consensus, 2) sphere of legitimate
controversy, and 3) sphere of deviance. This chapter concludes with the research questions that
guide this project and the methodology that will be used to answer those questions.
Chapter three includes a description of the history of news media in Bangladesh, its legal
and constitutional structure and its ownership pattern. The press has played a key role in the
development of a national consciousness in Bangladesh, even from before its birth. Still, it has
witnessed several waves of ups and downs with the authorities clamping down on the press from
the inception of Bangladesh. Apart from inheriting some stringent laws from British colonial
rule, the country has enacted and is still enacting harsh laws that curb press freedom, although
the country’s constitution guarantees freedom of expression. The chapter also discusses how
media ownership is connected, if not directly controlled, with the confrontational politics. The
chapter includes a description of how religion and nationalism interplays in Bangladeshi politics
and thus in journalism. The chapter also sheds light on the journalistic associations and on what
being a professional journalist means in Bangladesh.
Chapter four reveals the findings of the study, including description of the factors which
push Bangladeshi media to exercise self-censorship. The country’s legal structure, influence
from the government or the ruling power structure, influence stemmed from the media
ownership, influence from advertisements, individual journalist’s ideology or socio-political
view and religion are found to be the factors that push journalists and media practitioners to
exercise self-censorship. Chapter five contains the conclusion which summarizes what the
project found and its implications for our understanding of self-censorship in journalism. I also
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discuss the project’s limitations and future research.
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Chapter II
Literature Review, Methodology and Research Questions

In this chapter, I will highlight the literature that guides in my thesis, the research
questions that will guide my study, and the methodology that I will use to answer those
questions.

Defining Self-censorship?
The term self-censorship is self-interpretative. It’s an act of self-restraint. Self-censorship
denotes the act or action of refraining by oneself from expressing something (such as a thought,
point of view, or belief) that others could deem objectionable. Self-censorship is the act of
censoring or classifying one's own discourse. This is done out of fear of, or deference to, the
sensibilities or preferences of others and without overt pressure from any specific people, group
of people, party, social institution and/or any socio-political authority. Self-censorship is
ubiquitous in every society. Friends self-censor when they deliberately avoid a topic that might
hurt their friends; spouses self-censor when they do not express what they truly feel for the sake
of domestic harmony; employees self-censor when they remain silent even after facing injustice
because they do not want to incur the displeasure of their superiors; police officers or
investigators or journalists self-censor when they withhold information that may jeopardize an
ongoing inquiry; a newspaper self-censors when it does not publish news that conflicts with the
ideology that it espouses. Even the populace of a certain nation or ethnic groups exercises selfcensorship while talking about the past misdeeds carried out by their ancestors. For instances,
Dutch people and Dutch institutions exercise self-censorship while speaking about the liberation
of Dutch East Indies and such self-censorship is exercised by French, Russians, Britons,
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Belgians, Argentineans, Peruvians, Americans, and the people of other nations with a view to
concealing immoral acts committed by the ancestors (Bar-Tal, 2017).

Self-censorship has all along been a part and parcel of human communications. It was
exercised and is now exercised in every social sphere from antiquity to date, having no temporal
and spatial boundaries (Baltussen and Davis, 2015). The ubiquity of self-censorship proves that
it is an integral socio-cultural phenomenon. Philosophers and scholars have long debated the pros
and cons of the phenomenon in human communications. Jonathan Parkin (2015) argues that
political philosopher Thomas Hobbes concealed his own political, religious, and scientific views
for the sake of self- preservation and made self- censorship a centerpiece of his political theory.

Humans need to exercise self-censorship at times to not hurt others, or to uphold the
freedom of others. Scholars have argued that people exercise self-censorship either to avoid
“external negative sanctions” or to gain something positive (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 9). Some argue, it
is human instinct for people to try to conceal their wrongdoings and that is reflected in society
and social institutions like the state, political parties and religious organizations as their
characters are eventually shaped by the characters of the individuals (Bar-Tal, 2017). Hobbes
argues that self-censorship is a natural duty of a responsible citizen and an essential condition of
civil peace as, Hobbes thinks, the political problem is “the unrestrained expression of the beliefs
and opinions of autonomous selves pursuing their own goods; the inevitable clash between them
results in a state of war” (Parkin, 2015, p. 300). But there is a group of philosophers and scholars
who believe that self-censorship violates the freedom of expression or free speech which is
widely held to be one of the central values of societies as it has taken the center stage in the
Universal Human Rights Declaration (United Nations, 2020).
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The conflict here is between freedom and responsibility. Cultural and social conventions
which are often referred to as “civility” impose limits on us as to what we should do and what
not to do. Civility is an associational pressure (Ramsoomair, 2019). Ramsoomair argues that
civility also has the potential to degrade the quality of discourse, leaving “us too deferential to
majority opinion” (2019, p. 572). Chamlee-Wright (2019) argues that self-censorship fosters
both positive and negative outcomes. Peter Wood (2019) argues that humans are moved to bury
their ideas for many reasons. “Cowardice and conformity-for-conformity’s-sake” to avoid hassle,
he suspects, is responsible for most self-censorship. He, however, holds that “governing one’s
tongue” or self-censorship is a good idea. Governing your tongue, he thinks, means wisely
choosing when to speak (Wood, 2019, p. 604).
John Horton says self-censorship “can, for good reasons, give rise to some normative
ambivalence and that its ethical status is less straightforward than is that of ordinary cases of
censorship” (Horton, 2011, p. 92). He argues that self-censorship has its specific features that
make it problematic and holds that self-censorship should be “morally objectionable” like the
“other forms of censorship” (Horton, 2011, p. 102).

Given the myriad factors that characterize self-censorship, the types of self-censorship
can in a nutshell be distinguished based on a question as to whose will is dominant. Is the agent
who is self-censoring genuinely the author of the act or a mere performer or only playing a role
of instrument? Horton (2011) argues that the agents/persons/institutions/ who will have an
“element of reluctance, and a feeling of resentment” while censoring should not be called the
self-censors thanks to their unwillingness to censor (p. 100). Horton contends that the selfcensorship caused of others’ action can be thought of as justified self-censorship (Horton, 2011,
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p. 102). According to Horton, those who censor themselves “on their own volition and being
uncoerced by others” are the true self-censors (Horton, 2011, p. 99, 100).

Philip Cook and Conrad Heilmann (2013) argue that the complex phenomena of selfcensorship cannot be suitably understood without identifying two types of the phenomenon. One
is public self-censorship and the other is private self-censorship. Public self-censorship is
exercised in response to an externally existing censor or public censor. Private self-censorship is
exercised in the absence of an external censor, i.e. without any coercion. They defined these two
types of self-censorship in relations with the principle of free speech of the censee (the person
who censors). In turn, they recognize two types of private self-censorship: self-censorship by
proxy and self-censorship by self-restraint. Private self-censorship which is exercised through an
individual's “internalization of some external set of values,” such as “the norms of an
association,” is called Private Self-censorship by Proxy. The second type of private selfcensorship, exercised in response to an individual's suppression of his or her own attitudes even
in the absence of an explicitly external or public influence, they term private self-censorship by
self-restraint. They say this happens when an individual adopts a personal set of values that
constrain the expression of their attitudes like “a person may develop a personal code where it is
deemed impermissible to express obscene language or to speak about money in public company”
(Cook and Heilmann, 2013, p. 187). They argue that private self-censorship by self-constraint
can be defended as the most ethically justifiable because individuals are acting on their own
accord absent coercion (2013, p. 191).
Bar-Tal (2017) defines the self-censorship of information as an act of “intentionally” and
“voluntary” withholding information which would have a wide impact in society in the absence

9

of “formal obstacles” like official censorship. He argues that such self-censorship often obstructs
the “functioning of a democratic society” (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 4).

While outlining a conceptual framework of self-censorship, Bar-Tal (2017) elaborates
seven elements or aspects of self-censorship which helps define the dynamics that characterize
media self-censorship. They are: 1) information versus opinion, 2) limitations of self-censorship,
3) content of the withheld information, 4) types of self-censorship, 5) types of self-censors, 6)
experiencing dilemma, and 7) self-censorship and the society. Bar-Tal finds nothing wrong with
self-censoring opinion, but the self-censorship of information raises questions (Bar-Tal, 2017, p.
6). Second, he differentiates between “formally enforced self-censorship” and “socially enforced
self-censorship” and holds that the former is not self-censorship, but rather censorship (Bar-Tal
2017, p. 6). Third, Bar-Tal argues that the “content of the withheld information” influences the
dynamics (characteristics) of self-censorship. The characteristics of the phenomenon vary
depending on what type of impacts the content would put on people (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 7).
Fourth, the types of the self-censorship needs to be assessed (i.e., self-censoring by gatekeepers,
by the citizens and/or first-hand information or second-hand information) (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 7).
In the category of types of self-censors, Bar-Tal shows how a wide range of people and
institutions exercise self-censorship for various reasons that ranges from hiding wrongdoings,
crimes, guilt, as well as hiding crimes like rape and abuse by its victims. He argues that
bystanders also self-censor to avoid hassles. Bar-Tal points out that people exposed to various
documents and/or evidence often self-censor fearing that revealing that information might be
harmful to the people or a group of people or individual/s or for society (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 8).
Sixth, Bar-Tal identifies an individual’s dilemma to self-censor, pointing out that the level of the
dilemma varies from person to person and depends on the type of information, context, and other
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factors. He argues that if there is no dilemma about revealing the information in a situation when
the person does not consider the information worthy to reveal, then that should not be called selfcensorship (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 8). And finally, Bar-Tal argues that the dynamics of selfcensorship varies depending on the relationship between the self-censor and society. Bar-Tal
points out four motivating factors and four contributing factors to self-censorship. First a
motivating factor is the human desire to not harm the image of the ingroup, a second factor is to
avoid “negative sanctions” and gain positive sanctions, a third motivation is “intrinsic” (Bar-Tal
points out that people self-censor to maintain their “own positive self-view”), and a fourth factor
is the desire to uphold one’s own ideology and belief. The four contributing factors are: the
context of the group, individual factors (characteristics of the person who has the information),
the content types and circumstantial factors (Bar-Tal, 2017, p. 9-10).

From the above discussion, it is clear that self-censorship exercised by gatekeepers has
the potential to have a broader impact on society than self-censorship by individuals. John
Horton is of the opinion that the censoring agent – the individual or the institution – who is
exercising the practice (self-censor) should, in some sense, be “the author of the act” (selfcensoring), rather than the mere performer/instrument (the agent) in response to impending
threats (Horton, 2011, p. 98).

Self-censorship and Journalistic Work

Drawing on these two criteria, media outlets and journalists are agents of self-censorship
whose acts of self-censorship impact all of society. There has been a long debate over the issue
of self-censorship in the media. The everyday work of journalism involves many difficult ethical
decisions. Journalists need to make a choice in every stage of journalism like choosing headlines,

11

words, angles, pictures, and video/audio clips. The founder of the Ethical Journalism Network
and former General Secretary of International Federation of Journalists, Aidan White, calls it
self-regulation, not self-censorship (White, 2014). He maintains that self-regulation in media
“remains at the heart of producing credible, trustworthy and timely journalism” (White, 2014).
Terming “telling everything they know to a public whose right to know is sacred” is the media
industry’s fundamental mission, political cartoonist and author Ted Rall (2019), however, holds
that “well-intentioned, self-imposed ethical guidelines” also get in the way of this fundamental
mission (Rall, 2019).

A survey of nearly 300 journalists and news executives in the United States in 2000 by
the Pew Research Center and the Columbia Journalism Review reveals that self-censorship is a
common phenomenon in the news media (Pew Research, 2000). One-fourth of the local and
national newsmen say they “purposely avoided newsworthy stories”, while nearly same
percentage of newsmen acknowledge that they soften the “tone of stories to benefit the interests
of their news organizations” (Pew Research, 2000). According to the survey, some 41 percent of
journalists say they exercise either or both of the two practices (Pew Research, 2000).

A survey of about 1,000 European journalists by the Council of Europe reveals that
because of intimidation and threats, over 30 percent of the journalists said they tone down
“sensitive or critical stories” and another 15 per cent said they abandon these type of stories
altogether (Council of Europe, n.d.). One-fifth of surveyed journalists said they shape their news
articles in a way that suits their organizations’ interests (Council of Europe). Referring to a report
from the Ethical Journalism Network, White (2014) says Turkey’s major media outlets censor
news to maintain “friendly political and business relations with the state”. White further says that
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journalists in many parts of the world, including in Russia, China, Iran, Egypt, North Korea,
Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines routinely censor themselves to avoid physical, violence
persecution and assassination (White, 2014).
Terming journalistic self-censorship a “subtle, hidden, and insidious” phenomenon, ChinChuan Lee (1998) holds that paradoxes have shaped “inconsistent and uneven patterns” of selfcensorship in the media (Lee, 1998, p. 57). He observes that self-censorship can be embedded in
the everyday media practices in such a manner that journalists would not even know that they are
self-censoring. He fears that the “spiral of silence process” may set in if a certain “climate of
opinion pervades in the news environment” (Lee, 1998, p. 57).

Drawing on a study of Hong Kong media, Lee (1998) points out how self-censorship is
used in the exercise of power: dodging political controversy, hiring of pro-government or proparty or pro-ideology people to assume responsible posts, shifting of editorial tone in line with
the change of governments, redesign of space to reduce a newspaper’s political overtone, firing
of high-risk contributors, dissemination of writing guidelines on “sensitive stories”, and the
placement of sensitive stories in obscure positions (Lee, 1998, p. 57). He argues that the
censoring agents use tactics like “institutional absorption and friendship through honor,” respect,
gifts, and banquets and withholding of honor, benefits, and information in order to push
journalists to exercise self-censorship (Lee, 1998, p. 58). Journalists, on the other hand, selfcensor to obtain scoops and interviews from the respective power structure (Lee, 1998, p. 58).
Lee also found that journalists belonging to the same ideological group are less likely to fear
criticizing the party or parties of that ideology (cite needed here).
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Francis L.F. Lee and Joseph Chan (2009) contend that much of press self-censorship is
exercised without the managers of the news organizations “explicitly ordering it” and without the
frontline journalists knowingly doing it. But they maintain that staff and frontline journalists toe
the line of the newspaper/media outlets (and its editorial policy) even if superiors do not always
directly command them as to how to work on a story (Lee and Chan, 2009, p. 114).

Pamela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese (2013) argue that the media content is essentially
a social construction, given the multitude of factors that sway the media content. They are of the
opinion that journalists view and interpret the world in terms of their own image of reality, their
own beliefs, values and norms. They hold that the media content is influenced by “media
workers’ socialization and attitudes”, “media organizations and routines”, “other social
institutions and forces” and also observe that the media content is a “function of ideological
positions” and often “maintains the status quo” (Shoemaker and Reese, 2013, p. 8). Given the
multitude of factors that influence the media content, they have developed a theoretical
framework called the “Hierarchy of Influence Model” in which they argue that the media portray
a view that is influenced by multitude of factors on at least “five levels of influence” (Shoemaker
and Reese, 2013, p. 8). The five levels that influence media content are: social systems, social
institutions, media organizations, routine practices, and individuals (Shoemaker and Reese, 2013,
p. 9). The “hierarchy of influences” model explains how the multiple socio-political forces and
newsworkers’ individual factors play a role in the making of news and how they interact in the
process. While Shoemaker and Reese don’t deal directly with self-censorship, their five levels of
influence help us understand how influences on journalists come from many different places of
the society and why and how journalists go for exercising self-censorship.
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The Influence of Social Systems
Shoemaker and Reese (2013) contend that the social system is the foundation from which
all media content is constructed although it does not determine the exact nature of the content (p.
93). Reese and Shoemaker (2013) argue that four intertwined social “subsystems” – ideology,
economy, politics and culture, which are intertwined in many ways – sway media content (p. 69).
They also argue that a “national system” is the essential focus of the news (p. 64). They also hold
that the “news paradigm structures stories so that events are interpreted from the perspective of
powerful interests” (p. 65).
Agreeing with the notion of the British Marxist school of media studies that the dominant
ideology of the society is linked to the norms and practices of “journalists’ occupational
ideology” (82), Reese and Shoemaker (2013) contend that “whether ideological influences on the
mass media are judged to be good or bad, positive or negative, functional or dysfunctional,
depends largely on point of view” (p. 71). Subscribing to the idea of Siebert et al that the “press
always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it
operates,” Reese and Shoemaker argue political systems influence media (p. 72-73). They hold
that the “process of communication is central in the development and evolution of culture, as the
media help constitute how people think of themselves and how they construct values and norms”
(p. 73). Reese and Shoemaker point out that media “accept the boundaries, values, and
ideological rules of the game established and interpreted by elite sources” while accepting
“valueless reporting” as the norm (p. 84).
Media scholars are of the opinion that politicians give reporters access to delicate
information only to create their own narratives through the media. Political communication
strategist Frank Luntz believes that “it’s not what you say, it’s what people hear” and that’s he
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made it the slogan of his PR firm (Bennett, 2012, p. 111). Referring to Luntz’s argument that: “a
compelling story, even if factually inaccurate, can be more emotionally compelling than a dry
recitation of the truth” (Bennett, 2012, p. 114), political scientist W. Lance Bennett says news is
the “strategically constructed versions of events” as it “often translates the political world into
personal terms based on the existing emotions and values of audiences” (p. 118).
The Influence of Social Institutions
Agreeing with Castells’ idea of the media as a “generalized institutionalized space” (p.
95), Shoemaker and Reese (2013) argue that this space maintains a fluid, complex and multilayered relationship with other social institutions (p. 96) as it has a relation to “the welfare of
society or to the success of democratic government” (p.107). Social institutions and other forces
such as sources, interests groups, media watchdogs, rival media houses, advertisers and
audiences, public relations groups working on behalf of various social organizations, state
machinery and media market exert extensive influence on the media content (p. 123-128).
Introducing a theory of media objectivity, journalism historian Daniel C Hallin divides
(1987) journalism’s world of political discourse into three concentric spheres: 1) sphere of
consensus, 2) sphere of legitimate controversy, and 3) sphere of deviance. Based on the sphere,
journalists decide what they should cover and how, i.e. journalists self censor based on which
sphere information falls in. According to Hallin’s model, journalists feel no pressure to be
objective in publishing what falls in the sphere of consensus. In other words, journalists can
publish whatever falls in the sphere of consensus, without any reservation, as “those social
objects are not regarded by the journalists and most of the society as controversial” (p. 116).
Rather, journalists play a role of “an advocate or celebrant of consensus values” (p. 117). But the
question of “objectivity” and “balance” comes whenever an issue falls in the “sphere of
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legitimate controversy” where “objectivity and balance” stand out to be the “supreme journalistic
virtues” (p. 116) and the definition of objective journalism varies (p. 117). The sphere of
deviance is the realm of the political actors and views which “journalists and the political
mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard” (p. 117) and that’s why journalists
don’t publish report on what falls in the sphere of deviance. Hallin contends that “each sphere
has internal gradations, and the boundaries between them are often fuzzy” (p. 117). The sphere
plays “the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate
or challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of acceptable political
conflict” (117). Hallin opines that when “political issues were broached, personalization
transformed their meaning in a way that shifted them out of the Sphere of Legitimate
Controversy and into the Sphere of Consensus” (p. 136).
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002) introduced a model called the
“Propaganda Model” in which they show that the published or printed news content is nothing
but the residue of the “raw materials of news” and the raw materials must pass through five
social filters to “make the raw materials fit to publish” (p. 1). The first filter is “the size,
concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media
firms”. This is the most powerful filter which affects news choices (p. 14) when the media news
people are so overwhelmed by the elite domination of the media and marginalization of
dissidents that they become convinced that they choose and interpret the news “objectively” and
on the basis of professional news values” (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p.2). Secondly, the raw
materials of the news are filtered by the news managers, keeping in view the “revenue from the
advertisers”. Thirdly, the raw materials of the news are filtered by the “sources” as the “mass
media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic
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necessity and reciprocity of interest” (p. 18). The fourth filter is “flak”. The media content is
filtered to avoid flak from the audience and powerful quarters. If flak is “produced on a large
scale, or by individuals or groups with substantial resources, it can be both uncomfortable and
costly to the media” (p. 26). The fifth filter is “ideological filter” in which media news people
consider anti-communism a religion as Herman and Chomsky argue that the “ideology and
religion of anticommunism is a potent filter” (p. 31).
Sociologist Todd Gitlin (1980) points out some “causes of story selection” in institutions
or social conditions which exist outside the news organization. He argues that “technological
factors, national culture, economics, the audience, powerful news sources, and the ideologies of
the dominant social powers” sway journalists as to what stories should be selected (p. 250-251).
Gitlin contends that the ideals of journalists are “fluid enough to protect them from seeing that
their autonomy is bounded” and argues that journalists “systematically frame the news to be
compatible with the main institutional arrangements of the society” (p. 269). Gitlin thinks that
journalists’ sense of professionalism varies depending on things like “personal life-experience,
specific organizational arrangements, and the shifting boundaries of the ideologically permissible
in the wider society as well as within the newsroom” (p. 269). Gitlin points out that the values of
journalists are “anchored in routines that are at once steady enough to sustain hegemonic
principles and flexible enough to absorb many new facts; and these routines are bounded by
perceptions of the audience's common sense and are finally accountable to the world views of
top managers and owners. These factors shape the news; even centralized manipulations by the
state have to respect these limits” (p. 272-273).
Arguing that politics is primarily media politics, Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells
(2013) argues that the media constitute “the space where power relationships are decided
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between competing political and social actors” (p. 194) and this reality affects the content of the
news on a daily basis as it (affecting media content in line with the particular political goal) is
“one of the most important endeavors of political strategists” (p. 197-198). Castells argues that
“while politicians feed the media, the media often feast on raw politics, either to cook it for the
audience or to let it rot, so that the feeders become exposed, thus attracting the interest of the
public in both cases” (p. 227-228).
The Influence of Media Organizations
Shoemaker and Reese (2013) argue that media outlets function following a certain
“organizational and bureaucratic setting” having connected with ownership, roles, structure,
profitability, platform, target audience, influence from advertisers, and market competition and
the very nature of the structure of the media outlets – as an organization -- make it to “have an
important impact on content” (p. 135). According to Shoemaker and Reese, organizational
influences from media outlets can “distort journalists’ ability to objectively describe the world”
and independent journalistic practice may evolve in pursuance of the corporate goals of the
media outlets, leading to an impact on content (p. 157). As Shoemaker and Reese write, “By
establishing corporate policies in line with their own interests, owners can have an unmistakable
impact on media content” (p. 163).
Robert W. McChesney (1999) contends that the notion of professional journalism makes
the media organizations as the agents of “public service”. Pursuing professional journalism
means disconnecting “the editorial process from the explicit supervision of the owners and
advertisers of the mass media” (McChesney. 1999, p. 17). But “hypercommercialism” (p. 33), –
the excessive influence of advertising in the media to obtain success and profit – has brought
about a qualitative change in the “public service” role of the media organizations (McChesney,
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1999, p. 48). In professional journalism, the media content is not biased “by the dictates of
owners and advertisers, or by the biases of the editors and reporters,” it should rather be shaped
by the “core public service values” (McChesney, 1999, p. 49). But in the wake of “ever-greater
corporate concentration, media conglomeration, and hypercommercialism”, McChesney holds
that the “notion of public service – that there should be some motive for media other than profit –
is in rapid retreat if not total collapse” in the US media (P. 76-77).

Terje S. Skjerdal (2010) shows that self-censorship practice is widespread among the
journalists of the Ethiopian state media. And the Ethiopian journalists think that the practice is
justified because primarily of four reasons. The reasons are: “(1) relegation of ethical
responsibility; (2) elasticity of journalistic editing; (3) confidence in critical audiences; and (4)
adherence to social responsibility” (Skjerdal, 2010, p. 116). Various studies show that selfcensorship is encouraged in Asia in such a manner that it has turned out to be a “journalistic
practice” (p. 236). Journalists in Asia are advised by their seniors that self-censorship is a
‘‘responsible’’ function in order to ‘‘build and develop the nation’’ (Tapsell, 2012, p. 228).
Tapsell found that 71 per cent of journalists in Indonesia claimed that “decisions relating to
content might be changed because of the owner’s influence, even if the owner seldom attended
editorial meetings” (p. 236). In the process of exercising self-censorship, the media content (in
Indonesia) is “slanted to suit the owner, critical questions are not asked, and sensitive topics are
avoided” (Tapsell, 2012, p. 242). Jingrong Tong (2009) shows how the self-censorship practice
has turned out to be an “efficient way for newspaper organizations to deal with the clash between
their interests and those of the interests of journalists and the public” in China (p. 609). With
greater concerns over political safety, the self-censorship in Chinese newsrooms maximizes “the
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possibility of getting reports published at the same time as minimizing political risks” (p. 609),
although self-censorship is rare at the individual journalist level, i.e. frontline reporters in China
(p. 608).
The Influence of Routine Practices
While doing journalism, journalists exercise a set of routine practices. The routine
practices, which are intertwined with other levels of the hierarchy model of influence, play a big
role in mediating media content. Shedding light on the practices journalists and news managers
go through every day, Shoemaker and Reese (2013) point out that journalists follow a certain
routine while processing the raw materials of news until it is published or aired and in so doing,
the process “inevitably distorts the original event” (p. 182). Routines of news work that
journalists follow include maintaining sources (routine and expert sources), fact-checking,
maintaining “objectivity”, audience demand, presentation format, space in the medium, narrative
story structure, news framing, and maintaining deadlines. Shoemaker and Reese argue that these
routines provide levers to both the journalists and the power structures outside the media
organizations to influence the content. They argue that “media routines stem from three domains:
audiences, organizations, and suppliers of content defensive routines prevent journalists from
offending the audience and their sources” (p. 173). They argue that routine practices yield
“acceptable news stories by directing news workers to take facts and events out of one context
and reconstitute them into the appropriate format. Shoemaker and Reese think that journalists’
routine practices provide the “power centers on the outside”, like sources, expert sources,
advertisers, audiences, public relation firms, with a scope to influence media content (p. 203).
Dwelling on the influences exerted by expert sources’, Shoemaker and Reese point out that
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journalists’ choice of experts has an “important influence on how that meaning is shaped” (p.
189).
Herbert J. Gans (2003) equates news organizations with factories and points out that
routinization is equally important for the media outlets because they need to “distribute their
product more regularly and punctually” like other products, as news is a perishable item (p. 50).
In so doing, journalists are heavily dependent on their sources to get the raw materials of news as
they are to produce the product (media content) every day like a factory, without any hiatus.
Gans considers the source-journalist relationship to be “symbiotic” and argues that the
journalists, because of their need for a regular supply of information, cannot “alienate” their
sources (p. 50). Gans thinks that journalists, knowingly or unknowingly, help “legitimate and
even glorify the sources and strata from which they report” (p. 47). In this process, sources have
the first say in the report (p. 46) and the reporters turn into messengers of the people in power
structure, including political, governmental, and other leaders (p. 49). In so doing, Gans thinks
that reporters’ news stories include “myths, stereotypes, and biases that are prevalent in their
social circles and in the country’s newsrooms” (p. 57).
Mark Fishman (1988) shows how the routine methods of gathering news influence the
media content or determine the ideological character of the product. In the beat system, a
routinized practice of journalists, Fishman argues, reporters are “exposed to a bureaucratic
setting” and that bureaucratic consciousness is “invaluable for detecting news because it
indicates where the reporters should position themselves to discover happenings not yet known”
(p. 51). So, Fishman argues the essence of what reporters collect through “bureaucratically
packaged activities” is a production which is produced “within the agencies they cover” (p. 52),
suggesting that the reporters’ collections of facts/information is a social construction as opposed
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to just facts.
Pointing out that in news, facts must be “quickly identified” (p. 82), sociologist Gaye
Tuchman (1978) argues that verification of facts is “both a political and a professional
accomplishment” (p. 83). Tuchman holds that the bureaucratic nature of newsworkers’ routine
allows the reporters to present the fact or the information with an “interpretive analysis” (p. 97).
In the process of doing reporting, Tuchman argues that reporters are “engaged in the theoretic
activity of making sense of the world by constructing meanings” (p. 87). According to Tuchman,
reporters amass a host of “supposed facts” while checking the facts in the news and together they
form “a web of facticity by establishing themselves as cross-referents to one another” (p. 86).
Tuchman contends that the different approaches which are accepted as “professional tools and
extensions of news typifications”, to set story forms lead “the reporters to the wrong
conclusions.” And the “web of facticity” guides the reporters’ process of searching information
or news and then puts the produced news or content in a certain frame (p. 103), suggesting that
the facts presented in the content do not remain authentic, rather they go through some sort of
distortion. Tuchman also makes the argument the objectivity and/or professionalism is a part of
routine. The way the doctors tell the patients the “probable success of different medical options”,
the “professional reporters” guide the news consumers to decide what is the truth, by adding the
alternative truth-claims from all sides—a necessary practice of objectivity in the name of
maintaining objectivity and “professionalism (p. 90-91).
Warren Breed (1955) argues that every newspaper has “a policy, admitted or not”, (p.
327), suggesting that every newspaper has its own preferred view of society and life and they
often like to promote that policy by means of “slanting” the published news in the name of
pursuing “professional norms”. According to Breed, "professional norms" are of two types. One
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is “technical norms” which “deal with the operations of efficient news gathering, writing, and
editing” and the second one is “ethical norms” which “embrace the newsman's obligation to his
readers and to his craft and include such ideals as responsibility, impartiality, accuracy, fair play,
and objectivity” (p. 327). Breed, however, does not think that slanting means prevarication.
Rather, Breed points out, slanting “involves omission, differential selection and preferential
placement, such as "featuring" a pro-policy item, "burying" an anti-policy story in an inside
page” (p. 327).
The Influence of Individuals
In Shoemaker and Reese’s Hierarchy of Influence model, the individual level is the level
where the media content gets final shape after passing through all of the levels of influence as
individuals both “shape and are shaped by their larger institutional settings” (p. 209) and
individual beliefs are “core to the concentric rings” (p. 244). Shoemaker and Reese argue that
none of us can “escape having our actions affected by our personal subjectivities and life
experiences” (p. 238). Pointing out that personal and professional factors are closely related,
Shoemaker and Reese hold that both help “determine content, particularly to the extent that
communicators have the power necessary to imprint their own decisions on the product” (p.
238). Shoemaker and Reese also argue that partisan beliefs affect news decisions and such
influence is the “strongest in those countries with a tradition of partisan advocacy” (p. 227).
Journalism is an activism which takes place in a given society or in a given social
condition, not in isolation in a utopia. So, it is normal that the journalism would be affected or
influenced by the various social dynamics. Drawing on above discussion, we can see various
socio-political factors, social system or ideologies, cultures and ethos of a particular society, the
philosophy and behaviors of the social institutions, the moto and size of the media organizations,
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the complex nature of journalistic practices itself, and newsworkers’ (communicators/mediators)
individual characteristics and ideology put considerable influence on the news content. Although
all of the five levels of analysis have their own factors that put influence individually on the
news content, the factors from the most micro individual level to the most macro social system
are intertwined in many ways, reinforcing or undercutting the influence of each other.
Research Questions
While journalistic self-censorship has been examined in a number of different countries,
no studies of journalistic self-censorship in Bangladesh have been undertaken or no studies have
been undertaken to see what factors influence journalists to exercise self-censorship or to figure
out reasons that make journalists in Bangladesh filter media content. Bangladesh’s unique
history with journalism and expressive freedom (examined in the next chapter) makes
Bangladesh an interesting site for the examination of journalistic self-censorship. Selfcensorship, rather than being a forbidden practice, becomes a technique that journalists use to
enable them to continue to do their work.
This thesis will attempt to better understand journalistic self-censorship in Bangladesh
guided by the following research question: What factors do journalists see as the most important
influence on self-censorship in Bangladesh?
Methodology
Information to answer these questions was drawn from an extensive review of the articles
by or interviews with Bangladeshi journalists and media experts. While in-depth interviews with
journalists would be a good way to answer these questions, it is difficult to get journalists to
answer these questions and to assure them that their identities and what they tell the researcher
will be protected. Some Bangladeshi journalists have written about their experiences with self-
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censorship and some have given interviews (videos of these interviews are available on
YouTube). That list appears at the end of this thesis in the Reference section (see “Sources of
Journalistic Writings, Publications and Interviews”). To answer the research questions, I’ve
analyzed those articles and interviews, to better understand the factors and forces within
Bangladesh that influence journalistic self-censorship, how journalists respond to these
pressures, and how they use self-censorship to do their work. I also did a textual analysis of the
various newspaper articles and reports of various watchdog organizations to understand the
dynamics that influence the media content in Bangladesh.
To get the views of Bangladeshi journalists and media experts about the state of selfcensorship in the country, I did textual analysis of 61 published articles and video clips which
include interviews, opinion pieces and hard-news stories; and gone through some of the
discussions on the Bangladeshi media available on YouTube. These were obtained through a
Google search using key terms such as: “Self-censorship in Bangladeshi media”, “selfcensorship and Bangladeshi media”, “Press freedom in Bangladesh”. I also used Bengalilanguage key terms like: “সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ” (self-censorship), “শিশিয়া সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ”
(Media self-censorship), and “গণিাধ্যমির স্বাধ্ীনতা” (press freedom). The materials analyzed
cover the period from 2010 to 2020. Initial searches yielded 80 newspaper articles and video
clips, but 19 of them were eliminated because they did not touch directly on self-censorship or
press freedom.
The analysis yielded views on self-censorship and press freedom from 38 journalists, editors and
media experts on the state of Bangladeshi media (see Appendix: List of Journalists, Editors, and
Media Experts).
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Chapter III
History of News Media in Bangladesh
Bengali journalism began in 1818 with the publication of three Bangla newspapers:
Bengal Gazette, Digdarshan and Samachar Darpan in undivided India. Formal journalism was
introduced by James Augustus Hicky by publishing a weekly journal named Hicky's Bengal
Gazette in Calcutta in January 1780 (Banglapedia, 2003). The British colonial administration had
begun its rule in the subcontinent (now India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) in 1757 which ended in
1947. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan (comprising East Pakistan and West Pakistan) came into
being, and in 1971 East Pakistan achieved its liberation and became the sovereign nation,
Bangladesh. The first weekly from Dhaka, The Dacca News, was published in 1856. The Dhaka
Prakash was first published in 1861 and the Dhaka Darpan in 1863 (Banglapedia, 2003).

The press has played a key role in the development of a national consciousness in
Bangladesh. For the middle class elite, the media was a critical medium for mobilizing
nationalist public opinion, especially before and during the war of independence. Radio in 1971
became inextricably linked to the nationalist movement and its aspirations. Subsequently, during
the war, from April 1971 to December 1971, the rebel radio station was the most widely heard
voice of the government (Chowdhury, 2003). The period around the birth of Bangladesh
witnessed the publication of many newspapers and magazines that includes Banglar Bani (1971),
Ganakantha Samaj (1972), Janapada (1973), and Bangabarta (1973). After Bangladesh was
liberated, The Pakistan Observer was renamed as The Bangladesh Observer.

Immediately after independence, the newspapers suffered a major blow when most of
them came under fire under the Special Power Act, 1974 as some sections of the act essentially
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curbed the press freedom, on a plea of “prohibition of prejudicial acts” (Ahmed, p.18). In 1975,
the government took over ownership and management of four daily newspapers and the rest of
the seven dailies were banned promulgating the Newspapers (Annulment of Declaration)
Ordinance (Ahmed, p. 25). HM Ershad, who came to power on March 24, 1982, and appointed
himself chief martial law administrator, suspended freedom of expression and banned 693
newspapers before his rule finally ended in 1991 (Gonzalez-Foerster, 1994, p. 65). From 1975 to
1980, when Bangladesh experienced many military takeovers, the prime targets of rebellious
soldiers were the newspapers, radio and TV stations (Ahmed, 2006, p. 10).

In the wake of the fall of autocratic rule in 1990, an agreement was reached in a joint
declaration of the political alliances, highlighting the process of democratic transition, including
ensuring freedom of press (Ahmed, 2006, p. 10). The interim government, which assumed power
after the fall of the Ershad regime in 1991, brought some amendments to the Special Powers Act
and Printing Presses and Publications Act which relaxed some of the boundaries on the press
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 11). Since then, privately owned TV and radio channels were allowed and
dozens of news and entertainment-based TV and radio outlets were opened. After economic
reforms, particularly adoption of free market economic policies in the early 2000s, the number of
media in Bangladesh increased significantly. Khadimul Islam and Mohammad Yousuf (2017)
found the media system of Bangladesh to be “neither libertarian nor authoritarian, but
somewhere in the middle” (p. 6). However, they contend that the Bangladeshi media is “slowly
moving in the direction of libertarianism” with the number of private television channels
increasing (p. 6). The country has a total of 1,244 print media outlets, 477 of them are registered,
826 of them are daily newspapers and 273 are weeklies. It has 44 TV channels, but 26 of them
are active and three of them are state-owned. The number of state-owned radio centers is 22 and
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the number of state-owned FM transmitters is 32. The number of privately owned FM radio is 28
and number of community radio is 32 (Rahman, 2016, p. 326).

Use of Power to Issue and Revoke Licenses

Politicians benefit by regulating the entry of firms into particular industries (Djankov, et
al., 2006). In the media industry, this is particularly true. By acting as the gatekeeper for the
media industry, government enforced 1973’s The Printing Presses and Publications (Declaration
and Registration) Act, in force to regulate media entry through licensure. It gave government
officials, locally known as district magistrates, the power to grant permission to publish
newspapers. The law provides the magistrates with the power to cancel the certificate. Clause
20(a) declares that the government can ban a newspaper if anything morally unacceptable is
published in it. This also gives government the power to seize any uncertified newspaper
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 21).

According to Clause 26, all newspapers must provide government with four
complimentary copies of each publication. The Ministry of Information controls broadcast
licensing for both commercial and community outlets. Television stations have occasionally been
closed apparently arbitrarily, on the plea of breaching broadcasting regulations. Thus, the
government has monopoly power to grant or revoke permission for a media outlet that may or
may not enter the media business. The government often reminds media outlets that they can
revoke a license if television channels do not listen to government orders. All successive
governments irrespective of their nature either elected or military use The Printing Presses and
Publications Act in both providing license to their party men and revoking licenses of outlets
critical of governments.
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In the 13 years it was in power, the BAL government issued licenses to over 35 private
TV channels, 12 FM Radio stations, and 32 community radio stations. The BNP-led government
issued licenses to 10 TV channels (Rahman, 2012).

Along with the Printing Presses and Publications Act, the government in 1975 formulated
the “Newspapers (Annulment of Declaration) Ordinance” and banned all political weeklies
except the four taken over by the government. Using 1973’s Printing Presses and Publications
law, the government in 2010 banned a pro-opposition vernacular daily newspaper called Dainik
Amar Desh and arrested its editor, Mahmudur Rahman, in 2013. After being held in prison for
more than three-and-a-half years, the editor was released on bail, but his newspaper remained
suspended. He faces 70 legal charges including sedition and unlawful publication of a hacked
conversation between the judges of International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh (ICT,B) and an
external consultant (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

A military-led government came to power in 2007 under the claim of an emergency.
After taking power, it shutdown transmission of CSB News, the nation’s first 24-hour Bangla
news channel, for “forgery” as government officials were apparently unhappy about transmission
of unrest in the nation. In June 2013, the BAL government halted the broadcast of other private
channels, Diganta TV and Islamic TV, on allegations of airing provocative programs to whip up
public sentiment. Both channels were tied to the opposition BNP and Bangladesh Jammat-eIslami (BJI). Ekushey TV was shut down by the BNP-Jamaat government in 2002 (Rahman,
2012, p. 87) and in 2010 Channel One, owned by a close friend of former prime minister
Khaledai Zia’s son, was banned (Banglapaedia; Haq, 2014b; Rahman, 2012). Under the Press
Council Act of 1974, Bangladesh got a quasi-judicial institution called Bangladesh Press Council

30

for “the purpose preserving the freedom of the press and maintaining and improving standard of
newspapers and news agencies in Bangladesh.” The Press Council has formulated Code of
Conduct for Bangladeshi journalists. Apart from the Code of Conduct, the Council often issues
statutory order asking journalists what to follow and what not. In a statement, Bangladesh Press
Council in 2019 issued instructions regarding court reporting, urging media not to publish any
news or article that might influence the under-trial cases ("Press Council asks media not to
publish news that influence trial," 2019). Other than these, the Information Ministry of the
government often issues instructions, both written and verbal, for journalists and forms
committee to oversee the activities of the media (Bangladesh govt forms cell to monitor media,"
2020).

Monopolies and Political Ownership

Both the major political parties who have altered power since 1991 follow the same path
of giving license for private television channels to party members, particularly members of
parliaments, ministers, senior party leaders and their trusted and ideologically tied businessmen
(Razzaque, 2013, p. VIII, 36-39). These actions curb the freedom of the said press. The ruling
political elites always favor those financial elites who can contribute to their politics both
materially and politically. No one can acquire a private television license without the ruling
party’s patronage in Bangladesh (Chowdhury, 2003, p. 20). A majority of the newspapers and
most of the private television channels are aligning themselves with one of the main political
factions (BBC, 2016).

There are, however, a few exceptions. They are three leading English-language dailies:
The Daily Star, New Age, and The Financial Express and the leading vernacular daily Prothom
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Alo. None of these media outlets extend direct support to any of two major political parties and
owners of these media outlets were not directly involved in the politics of these parties.

Issuing TV licenses to party members was initiated during the BNP regime (2001—
2006). Ten private satellite television channel licenses were given to all the front rank BNP
leaders and their party men. In the following years, the BAL government followed the same path
by giving private television licenses to those who were their party men or businessmen affiliated
to party. In the years since 2010, the BAL government has issued licenses to 35 individuals. The
information ministry issued 16 private satellite channel licenses in the fiscal year of 2013-14
alone (Annual Report, 2015; Mamun, 2015). The domination of ownerships in broadcast media
started fading when the BAL government shut down the channels owned by rival political
members and began selling them to others after assuming power in 2009 (Haq, 2014). The BAL
government banned three TV stations belonging to BNP and Jamaat leaders while the militarybacked interim government, which ran the country from 2007 to 2008, shut down another
channel.

Constitutional and legal provisions

The Bangladesh constitution has guaranteed freedom of thought and conscience, freedom
of speech and expression and freedom of press (Bangladesh Const. art. 39). But the country has
several laws that allow press censorship (Bangladesh Const. art. 39, § 2). The section stipulates
the authorities can enact laws that curb press freedom, subject to “reasonable restrictions” in the
interests of the “security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency
or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence”
(Bangladesh Const. art. 39, § 2). The country enacted several laws to this end, like the Special
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Powers Act 1974 (now annulled), Official Secrets Act, 1923 and ICT Act, 2006. Recently, the
country enacted another law titled the Digital Security Act, defying widespread outcry from all
walks of life in society including from journalists and rights groups (“Digital Security Bill,”
2018). Amnesty International said the “vague and overly broad provisions” of the new law might
be used to “intimidate and imprison journalists and social media users, silence dissent and carry
out invasive forms of surveillance” (Amnesty, 2018). Top editors in Dhaka urged Bangladesh's
government to overhaul the law saying it will curb press freedom (Mahmud, 2018). International
watchdogs like Human Rights Watch have condemned the law saying it is meant to silence
critics (“Bangladesh: New Law,” 2018). The latest World Press Freedom Index prepared by
Reporters Without Borders says that Bangladesh slid four notches and is now 150th in the index
(“Press Freedom: Bangladesh,” 2019). Meanwhile, in a recent article in Bangladesh’s largest
daily, Prothom Alo, on the occasion of the latest World Press Freedom Day, former BBC
journalist Kamal Ahmed (2019) pointed out that “informal and undeclared censorship” from
unseen sources (practically from various government agencies including intelligence agencies) is
one of the two primary threats to the press freedom in Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2019). The other
threat is the cases filed on the pleas of “Defamation” and “Hurting sentiment,” particularly in the
issues of religion and the country’s liberation war, either under the Information and
Communication Technology Act (ICT Act) or under The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)
and recently under Digital Security Act. The country has long witnessed arbitrary use of the law
on these two pleas -- “Defamation” and “Hurting sentiment”, particularly to silence dissenting
voices. Kamal says the government agencies shut down news portals and newspaper whenever
they like (Ahmed, 2019).
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Journalist Associations and Professionalism

Bangladesh has a good number of associations of journalists. Jatiya Press Club (National
Press Club) with over 1,000 members is situated in the capital city of Dhaka. The club provides a
forum for political, social and cultural groups and individuals, for holding press briefings and
seminars (Media Landscapes, n.d.). Like the trade unions, the National Press Club is also divided
into the groups that are aligned with the two large political parties (Media Landscapes, n.d.).
There are other associations called Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists (BFUJ) and Dhaka
Union of Journalists. The offices of both are housed in the National Press Club building, making
the building a hub for journalists.
In addition, the Dhaka Reporters’ Unity (DRU) is the largest body of reporters of Dhakabased newspapers, television and radio, online portals, and news agencies. Founded in 1995 to
work for the interests of reporters, it has now 1,500 members. DRU organizes discussions,
workshops and computer courses for its members. Politics has less of an influence in DRU than
in the National Press Club.
In addition, there are a number of beat-based associations. These include the Bangladesh
Parliament Journalists’ Association, Dhaka Sub-Editors Council, Bangladesh Photo Journalists
Association and the Television Camera Journalists Association. All work to protect the interests
of their members (Media Landscapes, n.d.).
The Editors’ Council is an organization of editors of the highest-circulation newspapers
in the country. Formed in 2013, the organization aims to play an active role in protecting press
freedom, developing professionalism, and strengthening the editorial institution (Media
Landscapes, n.d.). It often issues statements against government policies or actions that go
against the journalistic community (Media Landscapes, n.d.). The Newspaper Owners'
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Association of Bangladesh (NOAB) is an organization of newspaper owners. They often use
their platform to bargain with the government on different business-related issues (Media
Landscapes, n.d.).
These associations are not active in formulating professional guidelines for the
journalists. A search of their websites could not find any such documents. Some of them do not
even have websites. However, the government enacted a set of Code of Conduct in 1993 under
the Press Council Act, which was amended in 2002, for the Newspapers, News Agencies and
Journalists of Bangladesh. The 25-point code (reproduced in Appendix B) calls on journalists to
be truthful and accurate, buts asks them “[n]ot to publish any news or publication detrimental to
National Integrity, Independence, Sovereignty, Oneness of State and Constitution of
Bangladesh” (see Appendix B). In 2018, the government also passed a bill of Broadcasting
Policy, proposing restrictions on the transmission of program, news or advertisements ‘harmful
to the country’s history and image, public interest or law and order’ by television and radio
networks or online media (Rahman, 2018).
Nationalism and Religion in the Bangladeshi media
Ted Rall (2019) argues that while there is an accepted belief among corporate news
outlets that they are responsible for protecting national interests, it should not be the job of
journalists. Most of the media outlets in Bangladesh are also aligned with the nationalistic
movements and consider the support of that movement part of their journalistic work (Khatun,
Abir, Rhaman & Rahman, 2017, p. 98). Dhaka-based journalist Udisa Islam (2019) argues that
apart from legal barriers, self-censorship and journalists’ own allegiance to the power structures
including the political institutions and ideologies are the two big threats to press freedom in
Bangladesh. Udisa argues that journalists are sharply polarized based on their affiliation to
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political structures and ideologies (Udisa, 2019). Based on a survey conducted on 100
Bangladeshi journalists aiming at figuring out the relationship between personality traits and
some specific psychological occurrences in journalistic work settings, Khan (2005) contends that
there is a “clear indication of noticeable relationship between journalists’ personality and their
occupational behavior” (p. 79). Inferring the study result, it can be said that journalist’s
personality traits influence the media content.

Since its inception in 1971, Bangladesh has developed a unique confrontational political
system stemmed from the clash of nationalistic movements. Bangladeshi society is sharply
polarized over what should be the nationalism of the country (Hossain, 2015, p. 2, 7). Country’s
two major political camps – one is led by BAL and the other is by its arch enemy BNP which
have been exchanging power in turn almost since the liberation of the country – are pursuing
politics based on two different ideologies. Those are: Bengali nationalism and Bangladeshi
nationalism respectively. The two nationalisms are a bit opposite to each other in terms of their
connections to the religion in particular. The advocates of Bengali nationalism say the idea of
secular Bengali nationalism is based on the cultures and ethos practiced by Bengali-speaking
people. On the other hand, the Bangladeshi nationalism, according to its proponents, is a
philosophy primarily based on the culture and ethos of the people of the territory of Muslim
majority Bangladesh, irrespective of their ethno-religious identities (Hossain, 2015, p. 3, 16).

Political scientists hold that the Bangladeshi society has been polarized almost vertically
on the question of national identity and political philosophy, creating a sustained political
instability and uncertainty (Hossain, 2015). They also think that Bangladesh’s longstanding
political crisis is rooted at the clash of nationalisms (Maniruzzman, 2016). Maniruzzaman (2016)
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maintains that Bengali nationalism is culturally in close proximity with Hindu religion while
Bangladeshi nationalism is pro-Muslim. Hindus are the dominant religious group in the
neighboring India which played the role of a midwife to separate East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh) from the West Pakistan (Kann, 2013).

As would be expected, when the society is polarized on the question of nationalism
thanks to its links with religion and journalists are sharply divided along party lines (Hasan, n.d.,
p. 163), that polarization will influence journalism. These polarizations and divisions essentially
force journalists to adopt self-censorship whenever issues connected with their interests and
ideologies get in the way of journalism.

Drawing on the above discussion, we can easily infer that the media content in
Bangladesh is widely influenced by several factors like government (political institutions),
constitutional and legal provisions, nationalism, religion and media institutions (types of
ownership), apart from journalist’s individual ideological preference and personal trait.
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Chapter IV
Findings and Discussion
All of the journalists, media experts, and academics examined for this thesis indicated
that the practice of self-censorship plagues Bangladeshi media. According to newspaper articles,
the country’s president (“গণিাধ্যমি সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ দরকার: রাষ্ট্রপশত," 2016) and the capital
Dhaka’s police chief (“জাতীয় স্বামথ 'সেলফ
ে
সেন্সরশিপ' দরকার গণিাধ্যমি: শিএিশপ
কশিিনার”, 2019) also openly called on the journalists to exercise self-censorship. In response,
Bangladesh’s largest circulation daily newspaper, Prothom Alo, wrote an editorial and criticized
the police chief’s call for self-censorship saying: “[W]hen the [police] commissioner says
something like that, it spells bad news for the journalists” ("'Self-censorship' of the media,"
2019).
Many of examples of self-censorship among the Bangladeshi media exist. In his blog,
British journalist David Bergman (2019), who worked as a journalist in Bangladesh for years and
was forced to leave the country, cited a glaring example of self-censorship. Bergman used the
example of journalists having access to a recorded telephone conversation between Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina and her UK Awami League party leaders. In the recorded conversation,
Hasina referred to the question of whether Khaleda Zia, the leader of the opposition Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) who was in jail at that time, would be allowed out of jail. Hasina
emphatically said in the conversation that if Tarique Rahman (Khaleda’s son and now BNP’s
acting chairman who is now self-exiling in UK) shows his arrogance with the prime minister,
Khaleda Zia would never be able to come out of jail in her lifetime (Bergman, 2019). Bergman
noted that “not a single media outlet in Bangladesh (as far as this blog can make out) actually
reported on this conversation although this video was widely distributed” as “no one would dare
to report on this conversation” (Bergman, 2019).
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Another example of self-censorship comes from a copy-editor of Bangladesh’s highest
circulated English-language daily newspapers, The Daily Star. The copy editor, Badiuzzaman
Bay, demonstrated how he slants the news article by changing words and terms to make content
more acceptable to perceived powers within society. For example, Bay noted that “the system”
is used instead of “the government,” “the student wing of the ruling party” instead of
“Bangladesh Chhatra League,” and the vague term “something else” is used instead of
“military” (Bay, 2019). As Bay suggests, directly mentioning of the government, Bangladesh
Chhatra League or the military in the news may entail risks for the concerned journalists and the
daily.
Journalists do not exercise as much restraint when mentioning the opposition political
party, BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party), as Bay (2019) noted, “BNP becomes more than
BNP,” suggesting that journalists can mention BNP in any case no matter what, as it will not
entail any risk. Mentioning the BNP by name will please the ruling party BAL (Bay, 2019).
As Bay describes self-censorship among Bangladeshi journalists, “Names are replaced by
titles, facts deleted, if not altered, and headings robbed of their ‘spark’” (Bay, 2019). Bay
attributes two factors behind the self-censorship: the government and the employer. He puts it
this way:
My deleted sentences, in the end, are a painful reminder of all the times that I had to
swallow my pride, toe the line drawn either by the government or by my employers oh-so
afraid of consequences, and put an end to the illusion of control over my own life (Bay,
2019).
The journalists examined in this study willfully spoke of the sources of self-censorship
(i.e. why Bangladeshi media and journalists are exercising self-censorship, or what factors were
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pushing journalists and Bangladeshi media as a whole to exercise self-censorship). Different
journalists spoke of two or three or four different sources of self-censorship, although many of
them touched on the same reasons. An analysis of the reasons the journalists referred to for the
self-censorship, a total of six sources that push Bangladeshi media to exercise self-censorship
were found. The sources of self-censorship are:
1. Legal Barriers
2. Government Interference
3. Ownership
4. Advertising
5. Political Partisanship as Unprofessional Activity
6. Religion
Legal Barriers
As discussed earlier, the country’s legal structure regarding press freedom or media
freedom has established several laws and acts that the government or the various government
agencies can exploit to influence media practices. The ICT Act and the Digital Security Act, in
particular, have created a sense of fear among the journalists. As many as 32 journalists told
Reuters that they are “living in fear of ever-tightening media laws and engaging in selfcensorship as a result” (Paul, Quadir, & Siddiqui, 2018). Daily Manabzamain editor Matiur
Rahman Chowdhury told Reuters that he will at times make the decision to not publish a news
report “purely to save the reporter” as he knows “the risks involved in publishing it” (Paul,
Quadir, & Siddiqui, 2018).
At times the pressure on journalists is less subtle. Mahfuz Anam, who has been the editor
of The Daily Star for 25 years, told Reuters that he used to write a column regularly and
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fearlessly, but now, he seldom writes a column. Anam has been charged with defamation and
treason in more than 80 cases filed by ruling BAL party workers in 2016, with damages sought
exceeding $8 billion (Paul, Quadir, & Siddiqui, 2018).
Fahmidul Haq, who teaches journalism, says that the ICT Act and the Digital Security
Act “have emerged to be tough laws in respect to freedom of expression” and cases are being
filed against journalists and online users (Haq, 2019). British journalist David Bergman writes
that government party activists have filed dozens of criminal cases against the same newspaper
editors. In addition, “dozens of journalists and editors have been arrested under the vague and
arbitrary Information, Communication, Technology and Communication Act; and there is a high
degree of censorship and - rather obviously - self-censorship. Television is particularly
controlled” (Bergman, 2018).
Journalist Kamal Ahmed said misuse of the provision of contempt court and libel suits is
being used in Bangladesh to influence journalists. “Even treason case was not spared” (Ahmed,
2017). Talking about the recently enacted Digital Security Act, Mahfuz Anam said the very
existence of the Act would destroy “all of enthusiasm and efforts of journalists” (Anam, 2019).
Anam attributed the Digital Security Act and libel suits to creating a sense of fear in the
journalistic arena, resulting in a sharp rise in self-censorship. As one journalist said, “We don’t
publish most of the news items nowadays” (Anam, 2019). In an interview with The Daily Star,
the country’s leading Bengali-language daily, Prothom Alo editor Matiur Rahman said some
laws like the amended ICT Act of 2013 and Digital Security Act have made journalism risky
and, as a result, journalists cannot write or publish what they think should be published (Rahman,
2019).
It is clear that legal barriers have a powerful influence on the work of journalists. These
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laws, whether they are used or not, serve to influence journalists out of fear of facing legal
problems. In short, the mere existence of legal barriers, whether used or not, can prompt
journalists to self-censor. And as journalists seem to understand, if these legal barriers are used
against one journalist it can serve as a powerful reminder to other journalists to not step out of
line.
Government Interference
While legal barriers can be powerful instruments of self-censorship, these legal barriers
are rarely aligned with a single ruling party. For example, defamation laws are available to all
people within society, even though certain groups might be more likely to use them against the
press. The second factor in self-censorship, government interference, differs from the factor of
legal barriers in significant ways. Government interference describes the very real political
pressure that ruling political parties put on journalists, either openly or covertly.
The ruling political party is synonymous with government in Bangladesh. Government
exploits all the tools available to it to mount pressure on media outlets. Government enacts and
uses various laws against journalists and media houses. In addition to government using the legal
apparatus and sometimes arbitrary orders to control journalists, it also often engages in
intimidation tactics. These tactics can include things such as filing legal cases against journalists,
phone calls from intelligence agents, barring journalists from covering certain events, and
blocking government ads to certain media outlets (Bergman, 2018). Government ads are the
primary source of revenue for the media in Bangladesh, particularly for the newspapers. It is
estimated that the government ads comprise as much as 70 percent of ad market in Bangladesh
(Ghatack, 2019).
Journalists often call this sort of government interference “bad political atmosphere” (as
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in, “We can’t publish that because of the bad political atmosphere”). Talking to the Committee to
Protect Journalists, Matiur Rahman, the editor of Bangladesh’s top daily Prothom Alo, said the
current BAL government thinks that “independent media is working against it” (Committee to
Protect Journalists, 2015). Matiur Rahman claimed that his “staffers are often followed by
intelligence agents” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2015).
This pressure, both covert and overt, has consequences for what is published. Mahfuz
Anam also reported government pressure. As he told the Committee to Protect Journalists, “Over
the past year, the media has gone into a mode of self-censorship." Anam alleged that the
government has become “totally intolerant to critical voices" (Committee to Protect Journalists,
2015). Photojournalist Shahidul Alam, one of the persons of the year selected by Time magazine
in 2018, said much of the media has “essentially made themselves spokespeople for the
government” (Alam, 2019). He said whenever “someone says anything that does not toe the
[ruling] party line somewhere and another, it is blocked” (Alam, 2019). Daily New Age editor
Nurul Kabir said journalists are “intimidated directly or indirectly by the government agencies as
well as the ruling party hoodlums” (Kabir, 2015). Kabir (2015) said the government closed down
several television channels and newspaper editors were arrested. He himself was “subject to
different kinds of intimidation many times” (Kabir, 2015).
Forms of intimidation can also be covert and subtle. Reazuddin Ahmed, a former editor
of the daily newspaper News Today, said restrictions come from the government through “novel
unwritten means” and as a result media have started exercising self-censorship ("গণিাধ্যমির
স্বাধ্ীনতা ও দায়বদ্ধতা", 2010). By “novel unwritten means,” Ahmed essentially referred to phone
calls from intelligence agencies and other forms of intimidation which were mentioned by others
above. Kamal Ahmed said the government’s “unseen control” over the media has created a lack
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of trust among the people in the media and which is in its peak (Ahmed, 2019). In an interview
with Deutsche Welle, journalist Shaukat Mahmood said the media outlets get phone calls from
different government agencies with instructions about what should and should not be published
(Swapan, 2019). Fahmidul Haq said a cloud of fear has swept across the country which is a key
obstacle to freedom of expression (Haq, 2019). He said much of the media are now under
government control (Haq, 2019). In the interview with The Daily Star, Prothom Alo editor
Matiur Rahman said his daily gets a very little of the government ads (Rahman, 2019). In one of
his articles, daily Manab Zamin editor Matiur Rahman Chowdhury (2018) shed light on a
gloomy picture of self-censorship his colleagues are exercising in fear of losing jobs that
stemmed from the government interference or “bad political atmosphere”. Chowdhury said
journalists can lose their jobs or their access to information and sources because of their
reportage. This at times happens even without the knowledge of their editors (Chowdhury,
2018).
Chowdhury referenced a practice where if a journalist angers powerful governmental
authorities, the editor of the particular journalist receives phone call from that powerful quarter
with a message that the particular journalist should be fired immediately. And Chowdhury’s
claim is seconded by Prothom Alo journalist Tipu Sultan who told the Committee to Protect
Journalists that "those not supporting the ruling Awami League are in the line of fire"
(Committee to Protect Journalists, 2015). Bangladesh Awami League has been in power since
2009.
Government interference plays an important role in journalistic self-censorship.
Government in Bangladesh attempts to overtly influence the work that journalists do through
legal means, by intimidating them, by having them followed by governmental agents, and by
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pressuring both journalists and editors. However, government also works covertly through
unwritten rules, limiting access to information and sources, and changing the rules of the game.
Ownership
As the literature on journalistic self-censorship notes, ownership often plays an important
role as to what content journalists feel it acceptable to cover. Ownership can influence news
content by directly issuing orders to cover or not to cover certain people or events or issues, but
it can also influence content through more subtle means. These more subtle influences can be
everything from hiring or promotion of editors to changes in newsroom policy.
Ownership influences journalistic self-censorship in Bangladesh in several different
ways. Since the government controls broadcast licenses, owners pressure journalists to engage in
self-censorship to make sure the government does not cancel their broadcast license. Media
owners, however, also have many different economic interests, some related to the government
and some not. Media owners work to make sure that journalists do not have a negative influence
on those other economic sources.
Mentioning that the current government has issued licenses for many television channels,
journalist Probhash Amin said the journalists are engaging in self-censorship not only because of
their fear of the government, but because it serves to protect their own interests and their loyalty
to a certain political party (Amin, 2019). Bdnews24.com editor Toufique Imroje Khalidi alleged
that “wicked people” have become the owners of the Bangladeshi media and that’s why the
problem of self-censorship has arisen (Khalidi, 2015). Khalidi (2015) attributed having other
businesses by media owners to one of the reasons of self-censorship by the particular media
outlet. The media owners obtain licenses by “maintaining relations with politicians and pay toll
to them (the politicians)” Khalidi (2015).
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Echoing Khalidi, journalist Maswood Kamal said the owners of as much as “95 per cent
of Bangladeshi media organizations” set up media outlets for their “business interests” (Kamal,
2020). Kamal (2020) said rich people and industrialists open media houses and maintain
journalists as their henchmen to protect their properties. Kamal (2020) alleged that The Daily
Star and Prohtom Alo – Bangladesh’s two top dailies – did not publish a report against KFC just
because they were owned by the same owner. Referring to the editor of another leading
vernacular daily newspaper, Ittefaq, being a minister for two terms, Kamal asked whether the
daily published any news on the corruption in his ministry (Kamal, 2020).
In an interview with Safenewsrooms.org, journalist Supriti Dhar said the media owners
usually exercise “some sort of censorships, especially if it goes against their interests, monetary
or otherwise” (Dhar, 2018). Dhar (2018) said the owners “usually control the editors and through
them all the journalists working at such media houses”. The newsrooms “have to operate as per
the leanings of the owners, given that the media industry is very owner-driven” (Dhar, 2018).
In an interview with Deutsche Welle, The Daily Observer editor Iqbal Sobhan
Chowdhury said that in the past owners used to set up media outlets with a certain noble vision,
but it has now “become like a job, rather than a profession thanks to corporate culture”
(Chowdhury, 2019), suggesting that media outlets as well as journalists are now more interested
in protecting their job for their livelihood, rather than upholding journalistic values, i.e. telling
the truth despite odds. In such a culture, neither media outlets nor journalists publish reports
which entail risks. Chowdhury (2019) said that against this backdrop many journalists are
making compromises either with the government or with business establishments and with other
interests, for their personal gains.
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Advertising
Advertising is an important influence on self-censorship within journalism, although
often journalists seek to deny that influence. As the profitability of journalism has decreased over
the years, the need to attract and retain advertisers has become ever more important. In
journalistic content, this can mean writing stories that will attract or help retain advertisers, but
also withholding certain stories or information that aligns with the interests of advertisers.
While the influence of ownership is a real concern among Bangladeshi journalists, that
concern is often coupled with fears about the influence of advertisers. As noted earlier, the
government in Bangladesh controls up to 70 percent of the advertising market, giving
government the ability to pressure journalists by withholding advertising revenue. However,
journalists also reported feeling influence from private-sector advertisers.
Saiful Islam Chowdhury, a Dhaka University faculty member who is also a former
journalist, said journalists sometimes work as “a puppet of the government or sometimes as a
puppet of multinational companies” (Chowdhury, 2019). According to Chowdhury, it is more
important to journalists to serve the needs of advertisers and media owners than to serve the
public (Chowdhury, 2019). Chowdhury said a culture of fear has gripped journalists thanks to
pressure from political and economic factors (Chowdhury, 2019) as the newspaper revenue
model based on advertisement is failing to some extent in Bangladesh, much like the rest of the
world (Uddin, 2020). Bhorer Kagoj Editor Shyamal Dutta said the Bangladeshi media don’t
write “against corporate houses fearing losing revenue from advertisements” ("‘গণিাধ্যমির
স্বাধ্ীনতা ও দায়বদ্ধতা," 2010). Iqbal Sobhan Chowdhury (2019) noted that the media sometimes
refuse to oppose the requests of advertisers. In the corporate culture, the owners and advertisers
often try to influence journalists and control the media.
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Against this backdrop, sometimes journalists refuse to stand up to the influence of
advertisers (Chowdhury, 2019). Journalist Tushar Abdullah, head of news for television news
channel Somoy News, admitted that they often face pressure from the advertisers (University of
Asia Pacific, 2016). “Before airing a news item,” Abdullah said, “I need to rethink several times
whether I should air it or not; whether it will enrage that brother or that sister.” Abdullah
suggested that they always need to think twice if their news reports will enrage anyone from
either from political leadership or from corporate world. Abdullah expressed his dismay saying:
“My [press] freedom is being sold only for Tk 500 Tk 800 Tk 2000,” (University of Asia Pacific,
2016). Journalist J. E. Mamun, head of news for television channel ATN Bangla, alleged that the
electronic media in Bangladesh has become accountable to government, the ruling political party
and to the financiers who give the media ads ("‘গণিাধ্যমির স্বাধ্ীনতা ও দায়বদ্ধতা," 2010).
Partisanship and Unprofessional Activity
Some of the journalists and media experts analyzed for this project identified political
partisanship as being an important factor in self-censorship. These journalists tended to see that
partisanship (or what some labeled advocacy journalism) as falling short of the professional
responsibilities expected of journalists in Bangladesh.
Saiful Islam Chowdhury, (2019) in his opinion piece in Deutsche Welle, said partisan
loyalty (i.e., loyalty toward a certain political party or group) has emerged as an Achilles’ heel in
Bangladeshi journalism. As I discussed earlier, Bangladesh’s society is sharply polarized on
political questions and so are journalists. Many of the journalists side with the political party they
like. They show their loyalty to their party both covertly and overtly. Chowdhury noted that
thanks to the culture of political loyalty, a tendency of advocacy journalism has increased widely
in Bangladesh (Chowdhury, 2019).
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Tushar Abdullah, head of news at Somoy TV, said Bangladesh’s journalism has turned
out to be partisan journalism (University of Asia Pacific, 2016). Describing the state of
journalists, Abdullah said journalists, while producing a news item, think about their future
standing within a political party or professional organizations. Could they be the minister (press)
after five years? Will they be members of Press Club, Press Council or the Press Institute of
Bangladesh? In Bangladesh, journalists who show their loyalty to a certain political party
throughout their journalistic careers are often rewarded toward the end of their journalistic
career. These rewards might include a position in government if the political party they are
aligned with stays in power. These positions can include the post of Minister (Press), a lucrative
position in Bangladesh embassies, the post of Press Secretary (PS) or Assistant Press Secretary
(APS) of the Prime Minister or with any position, or a position in the government or in the state
run bodies like the Press Council and Press Institute of Bangladesh. These positions are like
dream destinations for the journalists having political partisan loyalty. So they always think,
while doing the reportage, as to how they can serve the particular political party best so that he or
she can get any of the above mentioned positions toward the end of their journalistic career.
That’s why Abdullah said those journalists always feel pressure from within themselves to serve
a certain political party (University of Asia Pacific, 2016).
Journalist Mustafa Feroz, head of news for Bangla Vision TV channel, (2020) said
journalists are divided along political party lines and this phenomenon makes them more
responsible to the respective party than to the journalism profession. Feroz added, “Whenever
their party comes to power, that group of journalists tries to show more allegiance to that party”
(Feroz, 2020).
Nayeemul Islam Khan, editor of daily newspaper Amader Orthoneeti, described how a
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partisan journalist engages in self-censorship while doing news reporting. He used this
hypothetical example:
I’m running a newspaper of BNP’s (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) ideology. What I will
do is: I will intentionally publish a news item on the weaknesses of Awami League (the
arch-enemy of BNP). . . . This is because of my political bias (Mishu, 2016).
Journalist Masood Kamal (2020) said journalists belonging to a certain political camp
would never find anything wrong in the governance of their party when it is in power. Kamal
said, “This is very unfortunate that journalists in Bangladesh behave like political goons”
(Kamal, 2020).
Journalist Shaukat Mahmood talked about the reasons behind the partisan loyalty of
journalists (Mahmood, 2019). Mahmood (2019) noted that apart from shared ideological beliefs,
there are other reasons for journalists being partisans. First of all, a pro-government journalist
gets advantages in securing jobs (both in the government and in the state-run media outlets) and
secures social advantages such as land allocation opportunities (by the government agencies),
and the opportunity for foreign trips (Mahmood, 2019).
Dhaka University faculty member Gitiara Nasreen alleged that media can be purchased.
She said you can make “the media speak either against or in favor of any issue” ("গণিাধ্যমির
স্বাধ্ীনতা ও দায়বদ্ধতা," 2010). Nasreen suggested that media outlets or journalists write stories
in favor of somebody or something or decide not to publish stories or self-censor if they are
purchased (i.e. influenced by the means of money and/or political power).
Fahmidul Haq (2019) said there are some “dependent media outlets” which “work to
divert normal political activities to a different direction” (Haq, 2019). By the term “dependent
media,” Haq was referring to media outlets which get financial backing from political forces,
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particularly from the ruling government or any other power structures. These media outlets often
embark on a propaganda campaign in favor of their masters and while doing so, they resort to
self-censorship and the distortion of information.
Religion
Religious topics are sensitive in Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s largest circulation daily,
Prothom Alo, had to discontinue its weekly satire magazine Alpin after it published a cartoon-cat
named Mohammad (Majumder, 2007). The cartoonist was arrested, the publisher of newspaper
apologized and appealed for forgiveness following street protests about the publication.
Given the sensitivity of the religious topics, journalists and media outlets often exercise
self-censorship while publishing religious news. Freedom House, a US-government funded, nonprofit research and advocacy organization, reported in 2019 that online journalists and social
media commentators “continue to report a climate of self-censorship on political and religious
topics in Bangladesh” (Freedom House, 2019). Journalist Supriti Dhar, in the interview with
Safenewsrooms.org, said after the government machinery, religious “extremist groups” are one
of the pressure groups that “force newsroom to censor” (Dhar, 2018). There are several Islambased political parties and groups that take to the streets whenever they believe the media have
offended their religious beliefs. However, none of other journalists based on whose views this
study is conducted spoke of religion as a factor for self-censorship in Bangladesh.
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Chapter V
Conclusion
This project set out to find answers to one main research question: What factors do
journalists see as the most important influence on self-censorship in Bangladesh?
Through an analysis of interviews and published reports by journalists and other media
experts, a number of factors influencing self-censorship have been identified. The most
important factors, and the most commonly discussed by journalists and media experts, were legal
barriers, governmental influence, and political partisanship as unprofessional activity. It is clear
that in Bangladesh there exists a form of self-censorship that is enforced through institutional
forces, whether those forces be judicial, governmental, or political party. Those institutional
forces punish journalists who violate legal standards or do not reinforce the beliefs of the
government or political party. Journalists who do reinforce those beliefs are rewarded with
access to information, governmental positions, opportunities to travel and other rewards not
commonly available to all people in Bangladesh. The study findings appear to lend credence to
Peter Wood’s suspicion that “Cowardice and conformity-for-conformity’s-sake” to avoid hassle
is responsible for most self-censorship (Peter Wood, 2019, p.604).
Journalists and media experts also discussed ownership, advertising and religious beliefs
as being factors, but these were less commonly acknowledged. It is interesting that even when
journalists and media experts discussed these influences, they were often discussed as being part
of the country’s institutional framework. For example, the fear of publishing content that will
irritate advertisers was often discussed as a fear of losing governmental advertising. And the
impact of ownership was at times linked to how government or political parties are connected to
media ownership.
Religion is also an interesting factor in self-censorship. In the early stages of this research
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project, it was believed that religion would be seen as an important element of self-censorship.
Only one out of 38 journalists and a media watchdog identified for this project explicitly linked
religion as a factor in self-censorship. However, this does not mean that religion is not an
important element of self-censorship in Bangladesh. Rather, it might be that religion (as some of
the research in the literature review suggests), has become so closely intertwined with
government and political parties that it is not seen as being separate from institutional politics
by journalists. In other words, religion is not separate from government and political parties, but
is part of government and political parties. It can also be assumed that Bangladeshi journalists,
on the question of religion, maintain “sphere of consensus” of the theory of media objectivity
posited by journalism historian Daniel C. Hallin in his book The Uncensored War (1987).
This study helps us understand how journalists adopt self-censorship into their work in
Bangladesh. Self-censorship can be employed as a way to avoid punishment from powerful
forces, providing journalists some degree of freedom to continue to work. And self-censorship
can also be employed as a way to secure unethical personal gains. This study shows us how selfcensorship becomes the new normal for the journalists in Bangladesh. It also lends credence to
the idea that news is a social construction and reinforces the idea that media content is dependent
upon various forces that operate within any country.
Horton (2011) argues that the agents/people/institutions who will have an “element of
reluctance, and a feeling of resentment” while censoring should not be called the self-censors
thanks to their unwillingness to censor (p. 100). Horton contends that the self-censorship caused
of others’ action can be thought of as justified (Horton, 2011, p. 102). But those who censor
themselves “on their own volition and being uncoerced by others are, according to Horton’s
view, the true self-censors (Horton, 2011, p. 99, 100). The study findings show that Bangladesh
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has got both of Horton’s types of self-censorships. An analysis of the six factors would clearly
tell us that self-censorship stemming from Political Partisanship is a willful act. Journalists who
exercise self-censorship for their political partisanship do it willingly, spontaneously and without
coercion by others. So, in Horton’s view, it is true self-censorship. On the other hand, it was not
known in this study whether or not the censors or a portion of censors (i.e., Bangladeshi
journalists or the media outlets) exercise self-censorship show reluctance or some sort of
reluctance in case of the other five factors – Legal Barriers, Governmental Interference,
Ownership, Advertising, and Religion. All of these five factors are extra-personal i.e. the selfcensorship stemmed from these factors is exercised under coercion by extra-personal factors. So,
the journalists and media outlets who self-censor for these five factors with reluctance and
without their own volition can be justified, at least to some extent, as per Horton’s view.
Philip Cook and Conrad Heilmann (2013) categorize two types of self-censorship: One is
public self-censorship and the other is private self-censorship. Public self-censorship is exercised
in response to an externally existing censor or public censor. Private self-censorship is exercised
in the absence of an external censor (i.e. without any coercion). In light of these views,
Bangladesh has got both types of self-censorship. Again, private self-censorship which is
exercised through an individual's “internalization of some external set of values,” such as “the
norms of an association,” is called Private Self-censorship by Proxy. The second type of private
self-censorship, exercised in response to an individual's suppression of his or her own attitudes
even in the absence of an explicitly external or public influence, they term private selfcensorship by self-restraint. Bangladesh has all of these types of self-censorship.
Bangladesh’s politics is rooted in the issue of nationalism and has been ever since the
country was born in 1971. Journalistic work, as well as the country’s media, is deeply rooted in
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the issue of nationalism, too. Most of the journalists and the media outlets think that upholding
the nationalism they believe in is their patriotic duty, while exercising journalism. In so doing,
they think that it is their responsibility to write against the people belonging to the other side of
the line of nationalism and to write in favor of the people belonging to their side. The
partisanship comes from, in their words “patriotic conviction.” Most of the media outlets of the
country and journalists proudly announce their conviction to defend and uphold the spirits of
country’s liberation war ("চেতনায় মুক্তিযুদ্ধ কণ্ঠে মহাকাল," 2020; Jubayer, 2018; & Rahman,
2018). In doing so, almost all of the media outlets and journalists think that they should write
against the people and the political parties (mostly religion-based parties) who opposed the
country’s liberation in 1971 and it is the unofficial/undeclared yet widely accepted policy of the
media as a whole in Bangladesh. It seems that this issue falls in the Sphere of Consensus of
Hallin’s model of objectivity. Given the sensitivity of the issue (i.e. country’s liberation), none
dare to come out of this Sphere of Consensus, lending credence to Todd Gitlin’s claim that the
“ideologies of the dominant social powers” sway journalists as to what stories should be covered
(Gitlin, 1980, p. 250-251). So, when this issue comes before the journalists, they either selfcensor or embark on a propaganda campaign against the opposition.
After the two biggest influences – legal and governmental – which entirely depend on the
will of the ruling political structure, partisanship of journalist and ownership, which essentially
come from the political philosophy of the journalists and the owners of the media, play the
largest role in shaping media content in Bangladesh. Although religion does not have a visible
influence on the media, it has a wider impact in the country’s politics and society and thus on
journalism. It is suspected that a different methodology might be able to draw on the influence
and importance of religion. Therefore, all of the six factors that push journalists or Bangladeshi
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media to self-censor are well-linked with the country’s politics. It appears that journalism and
politics are nothing but the two sides of the same coin. In other words, country’s politics play an
instrumental role in shaping the media content in Bangladesh. If we think about improving
journalism, I mean if we think of making journalism as it should be, this study gives us an
important insight about what is not possible unless we think about improving the political
climate of the country. It appears that journalism will never be able to reach a stage where it
should be as long as long Bangladeshi politics allows it to do so.
Project Limitations and Further Study
While this study has identified some factors that push journalists and the media as a
whole to exercise self-censorship, relying on published interviews and writings has its
limitations. Due to the method used for this project, I was unable to ask how journalists work and
to ask people to explain concepts or ideas in more depth. Clearly a study employing some form
of in-depth analysis or ethnographic research would be a valuable addition to this project.
Although the media-content influencing factors identified in this study clearly fit into the
Hierarchy of Influence model, it’s difficult to demarcate which factor of influence comes from
exactly which level as the study could not give us a detailed map of the dynamics of the factors
and particularly when the boundaries of the levels of influence model are themselves fuzzy.
Any future study employing methods such as in-depth interviews or ethnographic study
could offset the shortcomings of this study. The study’s findings, however, give us an idea of the
state of journalistic self-censorship in Bangladesh. There has been not a lot of academic work on
how self-censorship plays a role in Bangladeshi media. This study also gives us an idea about the
socio-political structure of Bangladesh as well as how much that structure influences content
before it reaches readers and viewers. Despite its limitations, this study can best be viewed as the
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beginning of a deeper understanding of how the workings of Bangladeshi media and its role as a
vital institution of a democratic society and how self-censorship often obstructs the functioning
of a democratic society.
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পামর না. Interview by M. S. Chandan. Prothom Alo. Retrieved from
https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/article/1627183/%E0%A6%AA%E0%A6%95%E0
%A7%8D%E0%A6%B7%E0%A6%AA%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%AE%
E0%A7%82%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%95-

66

%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%82%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A
6%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%96%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%8B%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%AB%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%AD%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%
AC%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%9F%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%95%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A5%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%A4%E0%A7%87
Rahman, M. (2019, November 29). “Predisposed journalism can never grow and sustain”.
Interview by M. S. Chandan. The Daily Star. Retrieved from
https://www.thedailystar.net/star-weekend/news/predisposed-journalism-can-never-growand-sustain-1833100
Rahman, Y. (2019, January 7). Silence and self-censorship persist in Bangladesh after December
30 polls. TRT World. Retrieved from https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/silence-andself-censorship-persist-in-bangladesh-after-december-30-polls-23151
Rashid, M. (2020, February 23). িুক্তাশদমরর অনুেন্ধান এবং একটট হুিশক | পব -ে ০২ |
Investigative journalism [Video]. Interview by A. Sufian. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PLFcTWaeTNg&feature=share&fbclid=IwAR21YP
aP8a5Pr9kmgbBTVha46Jr5ieGrMsA0_OKrk30iqGWPWK2pfjzT2m0
Riaz, A. (2018, December 17). শিথযা স ভামব েতয হময় ায়. Prothom Alo. Retrieved from
https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/article/1570331
Saaz, S. (2017, May 5). Bangladesh, a Case Study in What Actual Censorship Looks Like.
Retrieved from https://lithub.com/bangladesh-a-case-study-in-what-actual-censorshiplooks-like/
'Self-censorship' of the media. (2019, April 17). Prothom Alo. Retrieved from
https://en.prothomalo.com/opinion/news/194178/Self-censorship-of-the-media
Setu, A. (2018, December 23). ‘গণিাধ্যমির সভতর রাজননশতক সরাগ িহািারী আকামর ছশেময়
পমেমছ’. The Daily Star. Retrieved from
https://www.thedailystar.net/bangla/%E0%A6%B6%E0%A7%80%E0%A6%B0%E0%A
7%8D%E0%A6%B7%E0%A6%96%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%B0/%E0%A6%97%E0%A6%A3%E0%A6%A
E%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A7%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%AE%E0%A7%
87%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%AD%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%9C%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%88%E0%A6%A
4%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%95-%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%8B%E0%A6%97%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%B9%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%
B0%E0%A7%80%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%9B%E0%A7%9C%E0%A6%BF%E0%A7%9F%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%AA%E0%A7%9C%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%9B%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%AA%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%
67

A6-%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%9B%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B9%E0%A7%8B%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A1%E0%A6%B
E%E0%A6%97%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%A3%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A1%E0%A6%BE
%E0%A6%B8%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%A3
%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%87
Sobhan, Z. (2019, November 29). “If you don’t have a free press, then you don’t have freedom”.
Interview by M. Khan. The Daily Star. Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/starweekend/news/if-you-dont-have-free-press-then-you-dont-have-freedom-1833115
Sultan, Z. (2018, December 21). ‘I no longer write the way I used to’: Journalists fear the
Bangladeshi government. Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved from
https://www.cjr.org/watchdog/bangladesh-elections-journalists.php
Thomas, M. (2018, August 6). Photojournalists are under attack in Bangladesh as student
protests intensify. Quartz India. Retrieved from
https://qz.com/india/1348976/bangladeshi-photojournalists-under-attack-as-studentprotests-intensify/
Uddin, J. (2019, December 4). গণিাধ্যমির গা বাাঁচ্ামনা নীশত. Daily Naya Diganta. Retrieved
from http://www.dailynayadiganta.com/sub-editorial/461559
Uddin, K. M. (2019, May 10). Why journalism can no longer bank on wrong economics. Dhaka
Tribune. Retrieved from
https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/longform/2019/05/10/why-journalism-can-nolonger-bank-on-wrong-economics
University of Asia Pacific. (2016, May). Press Freedom in Bangladesh 20 05 2016. Conference
session presented at UAP Department of Law and Human Rights, Dhaka. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFMM1xndLy0
Williams, N. (2018, December 16). Self-censorship in age of big data. New Age. Retrieved from
http://www.newagebd.net/article/59003/self-censorship-in-age-of-big-data
গণিাধ্যমি সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ আমগর স সকামনা েিময়র সচ্ময় এখ্ন সবশি. (2019, May 4).
Dainik Ittefaq. Retrieved from https://www.ittefaq.com.bd/capital/51002
গণিাধ্যমি সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ দরকার: রাষ্ট্রপশত. (2016, February 5). ournewsbd.net. Retrieved
from
https://archive1.ournewsbd.net/%E0%A6%97%E0%A6%A3%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%
BE%E0%A6%A7%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%AE%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B8%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%AB%E0%A6%B8%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%B0
%E0%A6%B6%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%AA/

68

জাতীয় স্বামথ 'সেলফ
ে
সেন্সরশিপ' দরকার গণিাধ্যমি: শিএিশপ কশিিনার. (2019, May 6).
Dainik Samakal. Retrieved from https://samakal.com/capital/article/1905425
ঢাকা শরমপাটে াে ইউশনটটমত
ে
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োংবাশদকমদর সেলফ সেন্সরশিপ োংোশতক সবমে সগমছ : িাহফুজ. (2019, November 4).
Dainik Dinkal. Retrieved from http://www.dailydinkal.net/2019/11/04/57876.php
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Appendix
List of Journalists, Editors, and Media Experts
1. Kamal Ahmed, journalist
2. Shahidul Alam, photojournalist
3. Probhash Amin, journalists
4. Mahfuz Anam, editor, The Daily Star
5. Saiful Alam, editor, daily Jugantor
6. Badiuzzaman Bay, journalist
7. David Bergman, journalist
8. Iqbal Sobhan Chowhdury, editor, The Daily Observer
9. Shaukat Mahmood, editor, weekly Economic Times
10. Saiful Alam Chowdhury, former journalist and associate professor of Mass
Communication and Journalist, Dhaka University
11. Elias Hossain, journalist
12. Matiur Rahman Chowdhury, editor, daily Manabzamin
13. Tipu Sultan, journalist
14. Matiur Rahman, editor, daily Prothom Alo
15. Supriti Dhar, journalist and women activist
16. Mustafa Feroz, journalist
17. Masood Kamal, journalist
18. Nurul Kabir, editor, daily New Age
19. Toufique Imroje Khalidi, editor, bdnews24.com
20. Tushar Abdullah, journalist
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21. Nayeemul Islam Khan, journalist
22. Fahmidul Haque, visiting research professor, University of Notre Dame
23. Nuruzzaman Labu, journalist
24. Faisal Mahmud, journalist
25. Muktadir Rashid, journalist
26. Zafar Sobhan, editor, daily Dhaka Tribune
27. Jasim Uddin, journalist
28. Mahmudur Rahman, acting editor, daily Amardesh (shut by govt)
29. Reazuddin Ahmed, journalist
30. Shykhe Seraj, director, channel i
31. Manjurul Ahsan Bulbul, journalist
32. Shyamal Dutta, editor, daily Bhorer Kagoj
33. Sanaullah, journalist
34. J. E. Mamun, journalist
35. Munni Saha, journalist
36. Golam Sarwar, journalist
37. Gitiara Nasreen, journalism professor, University of Dhaka
38. Jashim Uddin, journalist
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Appendix B
Code of Conduct 1993 (2002 as amended) for the Newspapers and News Agencies:
1. Not to publish any news or publication detrimental to National Integrity, Independence, sovereignty,
Oneness of State and Constitution of Bangladesh.
2. The War of Liberation and its spirit and ideals must be sustained and upheld, and any publication
repugnant to it to be stopped.
3. It is the responsibility of a journalist to keep people informed of issues which influence or attract them.
News and commentaries are to be prepared and published showing full respect to the sensitivity and
individual rights of newspaper readers as well as the people
4. Truth and accuracy of information available are to be ensured as far as possible.
5. Information received from reliable sources may be published in the public interest induced by honest
intention and if facts presented therein are considered trustworthy by logical consideration, then a journalist
is to be absolved from any adverse consequence for publication of such news.
6. Unconfirmed reports or reports based on rumours shall be verified before publication and if found
unreasonable on verification, be withheld from publication.
7. News items whose contents are distorted and baseless or whose publication hinges on breach of trust not
to be published.
8. Newspapers and journalists having the right to express their views on controversial issues and in doing
so:
a) All events should be truthfully reported and views be clearly expressed.
b) No report of an event is distorted to influence the readers.
c) No news shall be distorted or slanted maliciously either in the main commentary or in the
headline.
d) Views on main news shall be presented clearly and fairly.
9. The editor having the right to publish any advertisement signed by proper authorities in his/her
newspaper even if it is apparently against any individual interest should not be slanderous or prejudicial to
public interest. If protest is made with regard to such an advertisement, the editor shall print and publish it
without any cost.
10. Newspapers shall refrain from publishing news which is contemptuous or disrespectful to caste, creed,
nationality and religion of any individual or the community or the country. For upholding national unity,
communal prejudices and feelings of hatred and malice be discouraged.
11. If a newspaper publishes any news which prejudices the interest and good name of an individual,
agency, institution or group of people or any special category of people, then the newspaper concerned
should provide opportunity to the aggrieved persons or institutions to publish their protest or state their
point of view on the matter within a reasonable period of time.
12. If the published news is damaging or improper, then withdrawal, corrigendum or explanation be made
and in special cases, apology should be tendered.
13. For the increase of circulation of newspaper no vulgar, derogatory, ghastly news and picture though
attractive to the people, be published.
14. Newspapers should adopt reasonable measures with a view to resisting crime and corruption.
15. As extent and durability of the influence of newspapers is greater than that of other media, a journalist
writing for newspaper shall particularly be cautious about the credibility and truthfulness of sources and
shall also preserve his source material in order to avoid risks.
16. It is the responsibility of the newspapers to publish news relating to case under trial and to publish the
final judgment of the court to reveal the actual picture of issues relating to trial. But a journalist shall
refrain from publishing such comment or opinion as is likely to influence an under-trial case, until the final
verdict is announced.
17. Rejoinder of the aggrieved party or parties directly involved with news published in a newspaper shall
be quickly published in the same newspaper on such page as would easily draw the attention of the readers.
The editor, while editing the rejoinder shall not change its basic character.
18. If an aggrieved party sends a rejoinder for the damage done to him by an editorial, it shall be the
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obligation of the editor to publish the corrigendum on the same page and also express regrets.
19. Malicious news should not be published.
20. The editor is to accept full responsibility for all publications in the newspaper.
21. A reporter while reporting a case of financial or other kind of irregularity shall, to the best of his ability,
verify the facts in his report and shall incorporate adequate material to prove the truth of the matter
reported.
22. Any irresponsible publication to which no objection was taken cannot be source of news but a journalist
cannot shirk his responsibility on the ground of reprinting the same.
23. It is a responsibility of a journalist to highlight any news which projects degeneration of moral values in
the society but it is also the moral responsibility of a journalist to maintain strict precaution in publishing
news / photo involving man-woman relationship or any report relating to woman.
24. Any person who will join in a service of newspaper or new agency or any media of news shall be
bound to take oath and sign in presence of the editor as per form “Ka” as attached with this Code of
Conduct.
25. Any publisher of a newspaper shall take oath and sign under section 11(2)(b) of the Press Council Act,
as per form “Kha” as attached with this Code of Conduct.
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